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Abstract. The evaluation of the security, reliability and resilience of critical in-
frastructures (CI) faces a wide range of challenges ranging from the scale and 
tempo of attacks to the need to address complex and interdependent systems of 
systems. Model-based approaches and probabilistic design are fundamental to the 
evaluation of CI and we need to know whether we can trust these models. This 
paper presents an approach we are developing to justify the models used to assure 
CI using structured assurance cases based on Claims, Arguments and Evidence 
(CAE). The modelling and quantitative evaluation of the properties are supported 
by the Preliminary Interdependency Analysis (PIA) method and platform applied 
to a case study – a reference power transmission network enhanced with an in-
dustrial distributed system of monitoring, protection and control. We discuss the 
usefulness of the modelling and assurance case structuring approaches, some 
findings from the case study, and outline the directions of further work. 
Keywords: Assurance Cases·CAE Building Blocks·Critical Infrastruc-
tures·Power Transmission Network·Preliminary Interdependency Analysis. 
1 Introduction 
Reliable and resilient critical infrastructures are of vital importance to the society. Mod-
ern infrastructure components often depend on the information systems, which control 
their operation, monitor activities, provide real-time response to incidents and events. 
These information systems frequently become the target for cyber-attacks and can pose 
significant risks to the critical infrastructures (CI). 
In this paper we present a systematic practical approach to justifying the models used 
to assure CI, taking into consideration the possibility of cyber-attacks. Building on the 
assurance case approach, we are creating a structured security-informed reliability case 
with the use of specially designed building blocks [1] that are based on the CAE nota-
tion [2,3] and provide means for developing a more rigorous justification in assurance 
cases. The analysis of dependencies between elements of critical infrastructures as well 
as the quantitative evaluation of reliability properties are performed using the Prelimi-
nary Interdependency Analysis (PIA) method and tool [4,5]. 
The proposed approach addresses three key issues: considerantion of security attacks 
on the critical infrastructures, system model and assumption justification, and quantita-
tive evaluation of reliability properties for the system under attack. We use the results 
of PIA to support decisions about the critical infrastructure. The PIA approach deals 
with the stochastic properties and addresses the aleatory uncertainty. There are also 
epistemic doubts arising from our lack of knowledge of the world e.g. about the systems 
being modeled, the attackers. These types of doubts are interrelated and both need to 
be taken into account in the decision making. In this research we explore how combin-
ing the CAE Assurance Case approach with the PIA modeling allows us to do that. 
Our approach is demonstrated with a specific case study – an advanced power trans-
mission network – but it is not by any means confined to the power grids and can be 
used for a wide variety of industrial systems with complex topology and different func-
tional, spatial and other stochastic dependencies between elements. 
The paper is organized in the following way: In section 2 we provide a brief over-
view of the main approaches used. Section 3 introduces the case study. Section 4 
demonstrates how the approaches are applied to the case study to create a structured 
security-informed reliability case. Section 5 summarises the key findings and Section 
6 concludes the paper indicating the directions of future research. 
2 Overview of the Approaches 
2.1 Structured Assurance Cases 
An explicit claim-based approach to reasoning about safety, security, reliability and 
assurance, influenced by the basic model of argumentation developed by Toulmin [6], 
has been in use for many years. There are various solutions to structure assurance cases 
[3], [7,8], and to increase rigour and confidence in them [9,10,11]. In this study we use 
a CAE approach, which provides an effective means for presenting and communicating 
cases. A graphical notation ASCAD [12] is used to describe the interrelationship of the 
claims, argument and evidence. 
We extend the approach by developing a set of CAE building blocks that restrict the 
types of argument structures used in a case and help architect cases in a more systematic 
and rigorous way. Additional information on the building blocks including their defi-
nitions, application and guidance can be found in papers [1]. In this paper the building 
blocks are used to create a structured assurance case fragment for analysing reliability 
properties of power transmission system under cyber attack. 
2.2 Preliminary Interdependency Analysis Method and Tool 
Preliminary Interdependency Analysis (PIA) [4] is an analysis activity that helps to 
understand the range of possible interdependencies between the components of critical 
infrastructures. The objectives of PIA are to develop an appropriate service model for 
the infrastructures, and to document assumptions about resources, environmental im-
pact, threats and other factors. PIA is used for both qualitative and quantitative assess-
ment by accounting for both static (topology) and dynamic (behavioural) aspects of the 
modelled systems. The key concept of the PIA methodology is representing the system 
components as continuous-time state machines. 
The simulation of the state machines by the PIA tool produces series of events that 
are then aggregated by a subroutine to calculate the metric of interest. Typically, the 
metrics are various “loss functions”, e.g. the number of failed components, the duration 
of non-working state of a particular component or a combined characteristic of many 
components’ states. Statistical analysis of the metric data is enabled by repeating the 
simulation multiple times. 
3 Case Study  
The case study is based on a reference topology of a Nordic32 electric power transmis-
sion system. The network consists of 32 substations operating at different voltage lev-
els: 400kV, 220kV and 130kV. Every substation is organised as a collection of bays. 
There are four different elements: a line, a transformer, a generator or a load. Each bay 
connects one of these elements with the bus bar of the substation. Bays also include 
protection and control units, which are responsible for switching on and off the con-
nected elements. The control devices are typically used by operators or by a special 
purpose software (SPS) designed to undertake some of the operators’ functions auto-
matically and can both connect and disconnect the element from the bus bar. Each pro-
tection and control function (with respect to the individual bays) is available when the 
minimal cut set of equipment supporting the function is available. If the entire minimum 
cut set becomes unavailable, then the function itself also becomes unavailable.  
A structure of the Nordic32 network and the architecture of one of the substations 
are shown in the Fig.1. Other substations have similar architecture but with a different 
number of bays. The figure is only meant to provide a high-level overview, detailed 
discussion of the components is not necessary to understand the rest of the paper. 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of Nordic32 system topology (left) and the architecture of a substation (right) 
The substations are connected via a sophisticated information and communication 
technology (ICT) infrastructure, which includes a number of communication channels, 
control centres and data centres. Every substation has a Local Area Network (LAN), 
and a firewall protecting the LAN normally ensures that only legitimate traffic can pass 
through into the LAN from the rest of the world. 
The modelled system can be studied with operational environment where only acci-
dental failures are considered as well as those with cyber-attacks. In the later case, a 
model of Adversary is added in which the Adversary is tightly coupled with the assets. 
Further details about the case study and the various modeling assumptions can be found 
in papers [13,14]. 
4 Analysis of the Case Study 
In this study, our main focus is on the system’s reliability. We need to provide assurance 
that the system’s critical reliability properties are satisfied – this makes our top level 
claim. In order to support the top claim, we expand it in a more detailed case using the 
CAE building blocks structuring approach and eventually demonstrate that the proper-
ties are satisfied by using the results from the PIA method and tool. The assurance case 
is created with the ASCE tool [15]. 
4.1 Establishing the Environment 
As was mentioned earlier, we need to take cyber-security into account when assessing   
the reliability of critical infrastructures. Cyber-attacks can pose various risks and thus 
the top claim is too general to be demonstrated by a convincing argument that it is valid. 
We need to define the claim more precisely by making the adverse environment explicit 
and considering specific cyber-attacks. This is done by using a Concretion block, and 
the concreted claim states that “the critical reliability properties of Nordic32 are satis-
fied under specific design-basis attacks”. The instantiated block is shown in Fig.2. 
 
Fig. 2. Concretion making the attacks explicit in the claim 
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Making environment and attacks explicit in the claim highlights the need to consider 
various types of attacks, define them in terms of capability, frequency and justify that 
they adequately represent the possible attacks on the system. For our study, we analysed 
the effect of a single type of attack on system behavior: a cyber-attack via the firewall 
of a sub-station. The detailed model of Adversary and attack scenarios we developed 
are outside the scope of this paper and are described in recent publications [13], [16]. 
The justification of the models are performed in the side-warrant of the Concretion 
block. It can be supported by other documents and sources of attack information, e.g. 
scientific papers, insider knowledge, external expert analysis, and so forth.  
At this point, the case could also be decomposed to consider each type of attacks in 
a separate branch. This could be useful if the case was going to be communicated to 
stakeholders who are particularly interested in different types of attacks, or if the case 
is likely to be changed in the future by introducing new types of attacks that could lead 
to different critical properties to be considered depending on the attacks. 
4.2 Substitution of a Model for the Real System 
Once the top claim is concreted, the case continues with a Substitution block. For most 
complex systems, especially the critical ones, it is impossible to perform live analysis. 
Instead, a model of a system operating in a simulated environment is constructed. 
Therefore, we substitute the claim about the real Nordic32 system under its design-
basis attacks by a model M(N32) under the simulated attacks M(DBA). PIA is used as 
a platform to create the model. The substitution is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Substitution of the model for the real system 
When such a substitution is made, it is essential to justify that the model is adequate 
for the specific purpose it is being used for. We start with the side-claim stating that the 
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modelled system running in simulated environment is equivalent to the real system op-
erating in real life. “Equivalent” is of course context dependent and will need further 
justification. Therefore, the side-warrant is expanded to justify that all the models ade-
quately represent the reality and that the PIA simulation platform itself is trustworthy. 
Each model is analysed separately: the model of the system should adequately represent 
the actual Nordic32 system, the model of the usage should be realistic and the model 
of the environment should be adequate. The latter includes the models of attacks iden-
tified at the previous stage of the analysis, as cyber-attacks are part of the overall ad-
verse environment. The justifications are presented in Fig 4, where the argument nodes 
of evidence incorporation blocks explain why the findings of the PIA report and re-
search paper are taken as supporting the claim. There may also be further elaboration 
in terms of CAE, if needed. We used the IEEE research paper [16] as one of the evi-
dence supporting the adequacy of the constructed models. The interaction of the models 
is considered within the validity of the platform as composing models together is part 
of the platform requirements. The expanded side-warrant structure with supporting ev-
idence from PIA and other sources are shown in the Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Justification of the model 
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4.3 Analysis of Critical Properties 
At this stage, we expand the case further by considering specific reliability properties 
that are to be satisfied. In our case, these are the properties important from the customer 
point of view, concerning the power loss and availability of the service to consumers. 
The system must ensure that all consumers are connected to the grid most of the time 
(consumers should have 99% or better availability of the supply) and the losses do not 
exceed 20% of the nominal value. The property values should be calculated for indi-
vidual consumers, not the average one, otherwise some users could be disconnected all 
the time. The decomposition by the reliability properties is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5. Demonstration of the critical properties 
We used PIA to perform the calculations and justify that the modelled system meets 
these reliability requirements under the identified cyber-attacks. The effect of cyber-
attacks on the service provided by the system was measured using different rewards 
(utility function) linked to the supplied power. The length of a simulation run was se-
lected be the equivalent of 10 years of operation. The details of our evaluation can be 
found in papers [13,14]. Evidence Incorporation blocks are used to feed the results from 
PIA into the assurance case. PIA results returned in the form of JSON file were addi-
tionally processed using special aggregation functions (linked to the argument nodes of 
the blocks) to demonstrate that they indeed support the corresponding subclaims. 
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5 Findings and Discussions 
Overall, we found that structuring case method with the use of CAE building blocks, 
has enabled us to gain a clear understanding of the key issues that need to be addressed, 
identify the factors having the major effect on the analysis, and choose the best ap-
proach to achieving confidence in the results. 
Some of the challenges and observations from our analysis are summarized below:   Making environment and attacks explicit in the assurance case was essential for 
the analysis. As cyber-attacks have a great impact on the reliability, we needed to 
revisit the case study documents with the types of cyber-attacks toward the infra-
structure. Some of the attack scenarios were identified by our in-house analysis 
and the assurance case challenged the justification of our decisions. Other sources 
discussing the plausible types of attacks also had to be reviewed to provide con-
vincing evidence that they are relevant in a particular context and are indeed part 
of the security-threatened environment. We’ll be continuing investigations into the 
specific adversary models that need to be considered. Ultimately, the critical prop-
erties will only be satisfied for the specific set of attacks so it is important to make 
an informed well-reasoned decision at this stage of assessment.  Another crucial factor underpinning the success of analysis was the construction 
of an adequate model that represents the real system operating in its security-threat-
ened environment. At this stage the assurance case required us to provide convinc-
ing evidence that the models of system, its usage and the environment are realistic. 
In doing so, it was identified that the usage model was not actually realistic and 
did not correctly represent the use of the system in real life. Specifically, the model 
of a load had a property defining the power consumed, and the property was set a 
constant value ignoring the natural fluctuations over time of the consumed power. 
In reality the power consumption is not constant and the model ideally should re-
flect this. The model is simplified since the fluctuations are managed by the power 
utilities, which are not part of the system model. Clearly, the model of the system 
must be scrutinized and the assumptions it is built upon – validated.  In terms of the modelling platform (PIA tool), the assurance case also required us 
to conduct a thorough analysis and provide a validation report for PIA, which has 
been produced.  The property evaluation part was substantial and took a considerable amount of 
time. The studied system is non-trivial, the model consists of more than 1500 state 
machines. With the chosen parameterisation we observed a significant number 
(~4000 to 32000) of events over a single simulation run of the system over 10 years 
of operation. Many of these events require power flow calculations, which take lots 
of time to complete. Similarly, following overloads or generator failures, active 
“control” is required to find a new stable system state, which is another time con-
suming process. As a result, a single simulation run takes approximately 5 min to 
complete and obtaining results with high confidence requires a very large number 
of simulation runs. 
6 Conclusions and Next Steps 
In the paper we presented an approach to analysing critical reliability properties of a 
power transmission system under cyber-attacks using structured assurance cases and 
preliminary interdependency analysis method and tool. The paper is centred on the case, 
which articulates how one should address cyber-attacks and perform the validation of 
the model before the evidence in support is supplied by the modelling tool. 
We believe the presented approach provides a good overview of the important con-
cerns and efforts in assuring the reliability of any complex industrial systems. It dis-
cusses the need to explicitly identify adverse environment considering various types of 
cyber-attacks, justify that the system model can be trusted and show that the model has 
the required critical properties. Coupled with the PIA method and tool, the approach 
provides support addressing both aleatory and epistemic aspects of the integrated secu-
rity and reliability analysis. It can be used for a wide variety of systems and infrastruc-
tures. 
The future steps will be taken to develop an integrated tool support for the PIA and 
ASCE assurance case tools. In parallel, we are developing the CAE Building Blocks 
methodology and resources further, looking into the composite blocks and how these 
are defined, linking to challenge and review checklists generated from the blocks and 
more support for the formal aspects of assurance cases. In terms of justifying critical 
infrastructures properties we have indicated where the case presented in the case study 
could be expanded for a real industrial system. This is a very active and growing area 
with a number of research trends on argumentation, confidence and model based ap-
proaches and we plan to continue our research in this direction. 
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